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Summary:
The distribution of competencies between the different levels of a federal system may
have remarkable effects on economic growth, because mainly the regions of a country
contribute to national economic development. Thus, a government’s economic policy is
reasonably shaped along regional lines. The theoretical discussion in economics fo-
cuses however on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision and financing of
public services; rarely the argument is raised that decentralization or federalism in-
creases growth through a higher ability of the political system to innovate and to carry
out reforms. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments on federalism and growth,
we address the empirical question in this paper how important the assignment of deci-
sion making competencies and the design of fiscal federalism are for economic devel-
opment. Finally, on the basis of existing theoretical and empirical studies on economic
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1. The issue at stake or: From the dominance of efficiency aspects in fiscal
federalism research to an orientation towards growth
Modern research on fiscal federalism has focused mainly on the allocative and distribu-
tive consequences of a decentralized government structure (Richter 1994, Wellisch
2000). At the heart of the efficiency perspective is the question to what extent a decen-
tralized provision and financing of government services leads to externalities which in-
fluence the level and the quality of public services in other jurisdictions (Feld 2000, Feld
and Kirchgässner 2001, Feld and Schneider 2002). Depending on their properties,
these external effects encompass regional and fiscal externalities which, in turn, can be
separated – according to their interdependency in the structure of jurisdictions – into
horizontal and vertical externalities. Although their existence is undoubtedly plausible, it
is intensively discussed whether such external effects in fact lead to economically im-
portant efficiency losses (Wilson 1999, Wilson and Wildasin 2004). A final judgement on
the efficiency of competitive versus cooperative federalism does thus not exist. Exclu-
sively looking at fiscal competition in a federation, individual externalities might com-
pensate for each other as the example of a decentralized corporate income tax shows
(Sørensen 2004, Wilson and Wildasin 2004).
The assessment of the efficiency of fiscal federalism becomes even more complicated
if political economy arguments are considered (Sato 2003). At most, it is justified to
judge the effects of decentralized financing and provision of public services negatively if
government does what it ought to from an economic perspective, namely to correct mar-
ket failure. If, however, government failure occurs in the sense that the public sector, be-
cause of insufficient political competition between parties or between interest groups,
has expanded too much, then fiscal competition has a beneficial effect because it con-
strains the activities of political actors (Besley and Coate 2003, Döring 2001, pp. 62). If
the political economy problems are neglected, the central government could provide
public services in a differentiated fashion according to different local and regional pref-
erences and effectively internalize their externalities. It could hence limit decentralized
activity to the administration of these services. Decentralized service provision would4
then only be justified by the „frustration costs“ which result from being outvoted (Zim-
mermann 1999, pp. 31).
These controversial theoretical arguments do not lead to unambiguous results as to the
specific assignment of fiscal competencies in a federal system. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to test the competing hypotheses empirically. This is rendered difficult by the fact
that economic efficiency in providing public services is hardly testable in empirical
terms. Public services are considered to be provided efficiently, if the marginal cost of
providing them equals the sum of consumers’ marginal willingness to pay. However, it is
not easy to figure out individual valuations of public services because individuals have
incentives to under-report there true willingness to pay if they have reason to fear the
actual payment for this public service. The existing literature contains only few authors
who have made such an effort at all (Feld 2000, pp. 146).
In an alternative approach, the relative advantage of different federal arrangements in
their effect on economic development can be assessed by the extent they determine
conditions for economic growth. The assignment of decision-making competencies to
different levels of government can influence national economic growth by shaping re-
gional growth-promoting policies. The traditional public finance instruments, taxes and
government expenditures, but also decentralized regulations can in many respects en-
hance, but also dampen, regional economic development. For instance, the provision of
local and regional public infrastructure usually constitutes an important prerequisite for
development in a region. Tax advantages and subsidies ease, and rather high tax loads
hamper, the location of enterprises in national and international competition – ceteris
paribus. However, in his survey on fiscal federalism, Oates (1999) mentions only few
studies on the relation between growth and federalism, and in a letter of July 2002 he
again notes, „that there is not much in the way of specific literature on this issue“. At the
same time he points out (Oates 2002) that the question, whether a federal system has a
higher growth potential than a unitary system, constitutes an important subject for further
study.
In this context, particularly the empirical question has to be raised, which importance the
assignment of decision-making competencies in a federal system actually has for eco-
nomic growth. An answer can follow along two different lines of argument:5
(1)  On the one hand, one may ask whether it is favorable for economic development
and structural change in a country, if that country is organized as a federation or a
unitary state. By doing so, a top-down perspective is adopted, and the question
becomes which role the lower level governments perform for the economic de-
velopment of a country.
(2)  On the other hand, it appears important to know which type of internal arrange-
ment of a country favors regional development. For instance, a far-reaching hori-
zontal equalization may have positive or negative effects on regional economic
growth while the autonomy of sub-federal jurisdictions in tax and expenditure poli-
cies may be important for regional development. Thus, a bottom-up perspective
is assumed by focusing on lower level jurisdictions, regions and agglomerations.
At stake is thus the role of the federal constitution, especially its fiscal parts, for
regional economic development.
In this paper both directions are pursued. First, efforts are made to assess the advan-
tage of a federal system compared to a unitary system. Second, the various possibilities
to shape federal arrangements are considered. To obtain a concise picture on the state
of economic research in this field, the theoretical basis concerning the determinants of
national and regional development is looked at and open questions are emphasized
(Section 2). First efforts to explain the role of regional decision-making competencies
and of federal arrangements do exist already, but they need to be supplemented in vari-
ous ways. Empirical results on the influence of federalism on economic growth have
been reported recently in a number of studies, which are brought together in Section 3.
In Section 4 the shortcomings of these theoretical and empirical analyses are dis-
cussed, and an outlook is ventured on possible strategies for advances in this field of
research. A few final comments follow in Section 5.
2. Economic development, innovation, and federalism: Theoretical approa-
ches
Apparent differences exist in the growth performance between regions of a country, be it
for instance between the German Lander or the Swiss Cantons. This leads to the ques-6
tion, what determines these differences and which effects they have on national eco-
nomic development of a country.
2.1.Federalism and recent developments in regional economics
Since the early 1990s economists have made renewed efforts to analyze the determi-
nants of regional growth in more detail. The theoretical bases for this interrelationship is
to be seen in analyses of the effects which emanate from the process of economic
growth on regional structures. Important contributions in this field were made by New
Growth Theory, New Trade Theory and – building on these two approaches – New Eco-
nomic Geography. Additional contributions were made by considerations of knowledge
spillovers and on ‘creative milieus’, with the latter being of a more qualitative nature.
Before the background of these different theoretical approaches some preliminary con-
clusions can be drawn concerning the subject of this paper:
•  From the perspective of New Growth Theory, it is knowledge (or innovation) which is
decisive for explaining national as well as regional growth in high-income countries.
Models of endogenous growth are based on the assumption that a decreasing mar-
ginal productivity of capital which is perceived as an impediment to continuous
growth of per capita income in neoclassical growth theory has become irrelevant. In-
vestment in physical and human capital induces positive externalities which allow for
sustained growth (Aghion and Howitt 1998, Kurz and Salvadori 1998). The regional
implications finally depend on the model in question. But the approaches of New
Growth Theory have in common that – as opposed to neoclassical growth theory – a
systematic convergence of per capita income need not happen. Instead, differences
in income can remain during regional development or they may even increase (Mar-
tin and Rogers 1995, Martin 1998).
•  A number of New Trade Theory models try to combine explanations of endogenous
growth with trade theory considerations in order to develop justifications for strategic
trade policy (Krugman 1987, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Young 1991). In these
models, the factor of knowledge assumes a central position again, and by the as-
sumption of increasing economies of scale, of imperfect markets, or of heterogene-
ous products it enters the respective lines of argument. The authors conclude that,7
given international free trade, the long-term growth perspective worsens for countries
which are relatively poor in human capital and knowledge, because countries, which
are rich in human capital, specialize in the production of technology-intensive goods,
whereas countries, which are poor in this respect, specialize in the production of low-
tech products. In principle this argument can also be transferred to regions by as-
suming that such patterns of specialization are not only at work in the exchange of
goods between countries, but also at a disaggregate regional level. Thus, not only
countries, but also regions can reach a long-term growth path as locations of enter-
prises which have a knowledge-intensive production, the path being marked by per-
manent economic advantages vis-à-vis other regions.
•  A further explanation of growth differences between regions of a country are pro-
vided by New Economic Geography (Krugman 1991, 1999). At the center of the
analysis is the endogeneity of economic concentration. This is obtained by rendering
the size of markets the variable to be explained by the introduction of (partial) mobil-
ity of production factors and of firms. In addition, the inclusion of transport cost and
economies of scale are characteristic elements of the model, which are of central
importance for the analysis of centrifugal and centripetal forces and hence of
emerging core-periphery-structures (Fujita et al. 2000, Ottaviano and Thisse 2003).
In the simplest type of such models, market-size effects (backward and forward link-
ages) are considered the strongest centripetal power while regional immobility of re-
sources is the strongest centrifugal power. Under such conditions, economic ag-
glomeration occurs when the centripetal influences exceed the centrifugal influences,
which again depends on the size of transport cost. Interestingly, the models provide
a hint why national growth is not distributed equally across the existing regions, but
instead is mainly generated in agglomerations (Zimmermann 2002).
•  The dominant contribution of agglomerations to a country’s national growth is in ac-
cord with the fact that the distribution of newly generated knowledge frequently oc-
curs in regionally limited form (Anselin, Varga and Acs 1997, Varga 1998). In this
context, particularly the region-specific conditions, including social milieus and net-
works, which induce creativity and thus regional growth, are decisive determinants
(Camagni 1995, Bertuliga et al. 1997, Huggins 1997). Innovations are hence the re-
sult of collective interaction processes with the regional proximity of the actors being8
the prerequisite for an intensive and continuous transfer of knowledge. Additionally
assuming that knowledge spillovers are of central importance for national as well as
regional growth, they provide for an additional reason for the formation of agglom-
erations (Audretsch and Feldman 1996, Caniëls 2000, Keilbach 2000). In principle
two types of knowledge spillovers can be distinguished depending on whether they
induce the regional concentration of enterprises of the same sector (MAR–spillovers
or regional economies of scale) or of enterprises of different sectors (Jacob-
spillovers or regional economies of scope). Both types can also occur together, thus
forming even stronger centripetal forces (Döring 2003).
It follows from these theoretical approaches that the different institutional arrangements
of federalism influence the economic development of a country and its regions. Accord-
ing to the most recent results by Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) concerning the
determinants of international economic development, legal and political institutions de-
termine the growth performance of a country. The federal or unitary organization of a
state as well as the assignment of decision-making competencies within a federation
are an important part of these institutions. Decentralized government solutions facilitate
to stronger focus on the economic necessities in agglomerations. Agglomeration proc-
esses can then be supported in a useful way, for instance by specific investment in pub-
lic infrastructure or human capital.
2.2 Federalism and decentralization as a growth-generating process
Because of the regionally differentiating effects of growth processes, the question must
be more precisely, how federalism actually influences economic development: Which
impact on regional development processes should be ascribed to the fiscal federalism
and in particular to fiscal competition? Usually economists evaluate competition posi-
tively as the main force creating a high variability and quality of product supply and the
possibility that individuals can pursue their preferences. Tiebout’s metaphor (1956) of
‘voting by feet’ thus implies that competition has positive effects that mainly develop in a
dynamic economy. A decentralized experimentation of new governmental solutions for
economic problems occurs such that new solutions are adapted by competing jurisdic-
tions. Competition between jurisdictions thus becomes a discovery process which en-9
hances the prospects of political innovation. Federalism and decentralization lead to a
higher innovative capacity of the political system. Already in 1932, Louis Brandeis,
judge at the U.S. Supreme Court, summarized this argument in the following way: „It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country“ (quoted from Oates 1999, p. 1132). In this
context Oates (1999) speaks of ‘laboratory federalism’ and points out that the reform of
welfare in the USA in 1996 followed exactly these considerations (Inman and Rubinfeld
1997). This competition may induce regions to create favorable conditions for the use of
agglomeration advantages and to counter agglomeration disadvantages (Zimmermann
1990).
In a slightly different fashion, Weingast (1995) points to the advantages of a ‘market-
preserving federalism’. Starting from a „fundamental political dilemma", according to
which "a government strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is
also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens“ (p. 1), he considers competi-
tive federalism as a chance to reduce the scope of the government and thus to maintain
market efficiency. Because of the better migration chances of mobile investors, the gov-
ernments of sub-central jurisdictions conduct investor-friendly policies and adopt solu-
tions promoting market outcomes. Weingast continues an earlier analysis by Hayek
(1939), according to which „planning in a federation cannot assume the forms which
today are pre-eminently known under this term; ... In a federation economic policy will
have to take the form of providing a rational permanent framework within which individ-
ual initiative will have the largest possible scope and will be made to work as benefi-
ciently as possible“ (p. 268). This competition appears as particularly favorable, when-
ever fiscal regimes do not provide a reliable protection against excessive taxation
(Schnellenbach 2003). Similar conclusions can be drawn from the political economy
analysis by Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
Weingast does however not provide more precise considerations as to the growth ef-
fects of federalism. He only considers to the advantageous regulatory framework in
England in the 18
th century and in the US in the 19
th century as such systems of ‘market-
preserving federalism’. Rodden and Rose-Ackerman (1997) doubt that matters are so10
simple. They argue that decentralized government may follow the demand of local inter-
est groups and possibly protect these by protectionist measures from external competi-
tion instead of serving the general interests of mobile investors. Whether federalism
produces market-preserving or protectionist policies thus depends on further elements
of the institutional framework.
The higher innovative capacity of federations as compared to unitary states as possible
explanations of differences in economic development is also contested in general. In a
decentralized system, citizens use the performance of the governments of other jurisdic-
tions as yardstick when considering their re-election (‘yardstick competition’ according
to Salmon 1987, Besley and Case 1995, Feld, Josselin and Rocaboy 2003). A govern-
ment is re-elected if it provides a bundle of services and tax prices that are at least not
worse as compared to other jurisdictions. Governments thus have incentives to initially
wait to see which policies of other jurisdictions turn out to be relatively successful, and
then imitate these. Uncertain about their re-election prospects, governments have an
incentive to free ride with respect to the policy innovations of other jurisdictions such that
the absolute amount of policy innovations in a federation is reduced (Rose-Ackerman
1980). Strumpf (2002) emphasizes that this free-rider position strongly depends on ho-
mogeneity and on the number of jurisdictions. Heterogeneous jurisdictions less probably
free ride, because it pays off to them to proceed with custom-made policy innovations.
Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2001) argue that in a federation policy innovations offer
the possibility to selfish politicians to obtain personal advantages while marketing them
as the result of the uncertainty of policy innovations. Schnellenbach (2003a) takes the
incentives of voters in a decentralized process of political innovations into account. As
voters are normally rationally ignorant – due to the low incentives to be politically in-
formed – policy innovations are mainly possible in times of crises. The incentives of citi-
zens to be informed about policy innovations are improved by high mobility and by ele-
ments of direct democracy in political decision-making processes. Thus, political rents
of governments can be reduced by competition and politicians have incentives to inno-
vate.
Similarly, political scientists and sociologists, who have been dealing with the descrip-
tion and explanation of political and societal innovations in federal systems for some11
time (Walker 1969, Gray 1973, Berry and Berry 1990, Nice 1994), do not agree upon
whether federalism is favorable to policy innovations. Mayntz (1995), for instance, em-
phasizes the creation of knowledge which can be attained through parallel experimenta-
tion. But this result is questioned by Scharpf, Reissert and Schnabel (1976) and Scharpf
(1978, 1988, 1989): In the special variant of German ‘cooperative’ federalism, vertical
and horizontal coordination adds to the problem of the vertical assignment of functions.
In his work on the joint-decision trap in Germany, Scharpf maintains that the problem
solving capacity of cooperative federalism is chronically suboptimal so that the capacity
to innovate in federalism is noticeably reduced (see also Schmidt 2001, p. 477).
In the political discussion in Germany, these results constitute an important argument
against German cooperative federalism and they are discussed in several recent con-
tributions (Darnstädt 2003). Indeed, some authors, like Blankart and Mueller (2002),
hold the second chamber (Bundesrat) partially responsible for the missing reforms in
Germany. When the current German growth weakness is considered, that largely de-
pends on the lack of the political system to innovate, then the importance of political in-
novations for the national development of a country is apparent. But the discussion in
this section also underlines that the impact of federalism on growth is multi-dimensional
such that it is insufficient to compare federalism and unitary states. Instead, it seems
reasonable to more closely look at the design of the federal system and in particular on
the decentralized provision and financing of public services.
2.3 Federalism and regional convergence
This verdict is still more obvious if another line of research is considered. It is often
maintained that fiscal federalism in its competitive form with far-reaching competencies
of the subnational levels to decide on revenue and functions leads to a situation in which
poor regions become poorer and rich regions become richer (Feld 2002, Feld and
Kirchgässner 2003, Thierstein et al. 2003). The more high income taxpayers reside in a
region, the lower its tax burden is supposed to be. Poor regions, however, presumably
need high taxes to be able to finance the infrastructure necessary for economic devel-
opment. If these jurisdictions enter fiscal competition, then, so the argument, economic
differences between regions are maintained or even increased. Fiscal competition12
should then be eliminated by harmonization or centralization of fiscal policies and sup-
plemented by a grants system designed to equalize regional fiscal potential. According
to this line of thought, central government fiscal policy finds itself in the leading role to
ascertain sufficient regional development, while the question whether national growth is
positively affected usually remains unanswered.
Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000), Justman, Thisse
and van Ypersele (2002), Brakman, Garretsen and Van Marrewijk (2003) as well as
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) analyze the effects of fiscal competition on the economic
development of central and peripheral regions, with especially the last two groups of
authors arguing explicitly on the basis of New Economic Geography. The advantages of
agglomerations in the economic centers permit these centers to raise higher taxes than
the peripheral regions (Borck and Pflüger 2004). An example from the EU may illustrate
this. The Rhine region comprised of Dutch, Belgian, French, German and Swiss regions
offers enterprises sizable advantages from excellent infrastructure, from well-established
relations with customers and suppliers, and with a highly qualified workforce so that it
can afford relatively high tax burdens. Peripheral regions, like Ireland or Portugal, have
hardly other alternatives to balance their locational disadvantages than tax policy and the
public investment in infrastructure for enterprises. They must try to attract enterprises
through an appropriate mix of tax burden and public services. Similar considerations
can, looking at Germany, be made with respect to the relation between the regions in
the Southern Lander (Baden-Württemberg, Bayern), which develop economically in a
dynamic way, and the less developed Western Lander (Schleswig-Holstein, Saarland)
or the East German Lander. Limiting fiscal competition would take away the few instru-
ments from the peripheral regions to compensate – at least partially – their locational
disadvantages vis-à-vis the center, and it would thus be harmful for regional develop-
ment.
Beyond all this, the question can be asked whether fiscal transfers as means of fiscal
equalization can support regional development processes. For the formation of ag-
glomerations and hence for regional economic growth the factor ‘knowledge’ and the
existence of knowledge-spillovers are, as mentioned before, of decisive importance.
Döring (2002) analyzes the implications for the design of vertical and horizontal fiscal13
relations. When considering the adequate degree of centralization of growth policy and
regional policy and the relevance of regional innovation networks and of regionally lim-
ited innovative milieus for the generation and diffusion of knowledge, much speaks in
favor of a considerable decentralization of the existing governmental instruments. Look-
ing at the horizontal dimension of fiscal relations and given the understanding of the in-
teraction between regionally limited knowledge externalities, regional growth poles, and
the resulting agglomeration advantages, good reasons must support the interregional
transfers that supposedly support regional growth. From the perspective of a growth-
oriented system of fiscal equalization, the distributive motivation of inter-regional trans-
fers has to become less important. Similar arguments are found in the discussion on
how to reform the German fiscal equalization system (Zimmermann 2001a).
3. The results of previous empirical work
The existing theoretical results do not provide clear-cut evidence on the impact of fiscal
federalism on economic development. However, they do also not contradict the h y-
pothesis, that it is favorable for economic growth to assign far-reaching competencies to
tax and to provide public services to the subnational levels: Among the few federations
world-wide, high income countries dominate ( Dillinger 1994). Well-functioning sub-
central units are thus at least not an obstacle for the generation of high income. Moreo-
ver, it has been observed for quite some time that remarkably few elements of a federal
governmental structure can be found in developing countries. Nevertheless, the influence
of federalism on economic development has hardly been analyzed empirically in a sys-
tematic way. Oates (2002) states with respect to these studies: „Unfortunately it does
not give us a consistent set of results“.
3.1 Cross-country studies
The authors of the few studies on the impact of federalism on economic development
that have been conducted on a cross-country analysis indeed end up with controversial
results (see Table 1). Davoodi and Zou (1998), for instance, find a weakly significant
negative correlation between the degree of fiscal federalism and the average growth
rate of GDP per capita for a sample of 46 countries and the period from 1970 to 1989.14
This effect is not significant for the sub-sample of developed countries. The negative
influence for developing countries is however robust, though only weakly significant as
well. According to these estimates, an additional decentralization of functions by 10 per-
cent reduces the growth of real GDP per capita in developing countries by 0.7 – 0.8
percentage points. Woller and Philipps (1998) do not report a robust relation between
economic growth and decentralization, using a sample with a lower number of develop-
ing countries and a shorter period. Also, they analyze, in addition to the average growth
rates for five years, the annual growth rates in a panel. Both studies use fixed-effects-
models. In contrast to Davoodi and Zou, Woller and Philipps consider a common time
trend by including a trend variable.
Table 1: Empirical studies on the influence of fiscal decentralization or feder-
alism on economic growth in cross-country studies
















of spending reduces growth
of real GDP per capita in de-














No robust significant effect of
the decentralization of
spending or revenue on



















tures at the local level in-
creases growth of real GDP
per capita in unitary states
more than in federal coun-
tries. Decentralization at the













OLS, 2SLS 10% higher decentralization
of revenue reduces growth of
real GDP per capita in devel-
oping countries by 0.14%-








OLS Decentralization of spending
by 10% increases growth of
real GDP per capita by
0.15%-points (5% signifi-




26 Countries Panel data
1981-1995
GLS Decentralization of spending
by 10% increases growth of15
real GDP per capita by
0.12%-points (5% signifi-
cance level).
Additionally considering institutional aspects, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003) pres-
ent evidence for average economic growth of the past 25 years in a cross-section of 91
countries that the effects of fiscal decentralization largely depend on the structure of the
party system as well as on the degree of „subordination“ of subnational levels. Accord-
ing to these results, the age of the most important political parties is favorable to the
positive effects of decentralization on economic growth particularly in developing and
transition countries. In countries with a – in this respect– weaker party system a 10 per-
cent higher decentralization of revenue decreases the growth of real GDP per capita in
developing countries by 0.14 percentage points. These results challenge those by
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2002) according to which the decentralization of revenue
significantly reduces growth of real GDP per capita of developed countries, but not of
developing and transition countries. Yilmaz (2000) analyses the different effects of fiscal
decentralization in 17 unitary and 13 federal states for the period 1971-1990 with annual
data. Decentralization of expenditures to the local level increases the growth of real
GDP per capita in unitary states more than in federal countries. However, decentraliza-
tion to the regional level in federal countries is not significant. Thießen (2003) analyses,
similar to Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003), the average growth rates of real GDP
per capita for a cross-section of 21 developed countries in the period 1973-1998 and in
a companion study (Thießen 2003a) for a panel of 26 countries and the period 1981 to
1995. According to his estimates a 10% stronger decentralization of expenditures in-
creases the growth of real GDP per capita by 0.12-0.15%-points in high-income coun-
tries. But the relation between federalism and economic growth might be non-linear as a
quadratic term of expenditure decentralization is significantly negative.
3.2 Studies for China, Ukraine, the U.S. and Germany
The empirical results concerning the impact of decentralization on economic growth for
individual countries are no less ambiguous. Analyses have been conducted for China,
the Ukraine the U.S., and Germany. Zhang and Zou (1998) report a significantly negative
effect of expenditure decentralization on economic growth in 28 Chinese provinces, us-16
ing annual data between 1987 and 1993. Jin, Qian and Weingast (1999), however, find
a weekly significant positive effect of expenditure decentralization on the economic
growth of almost the same sample of Chinese provinces over time. The most important
difference between the studies – aside the small differences in the explanatory variables
used – consists in the fact that Zhang and Zou do not use time dummies. Consequently,
the common positive and negative economic shocks in China are inadequately included
as compared to Jin et al. Qiao, Martinez-Vazquez and Xu (2002) report similarly posi-
tive growth results for expenditure decentralization even without any fixed effects. Lin
and Liu (2000) corroborate the result of a positive impact of decentralization on eco-
nomic growth in Chinese provinces for the period 1970 to 1993 also for the revenue
side. Moreover, a higher responsibility of public budgets at the provincial level is asso-
ciated with increased economic growth. These authors, too, use time dummies in addi-
tion to cross-section fixed effects. The relevance for the estimates of using time dum-
mies points to the strong economic dynamics in China. The sometimes enormously high
Chinese growth rates apparently cannot be exclusively covered by structural variables
such that dummy variables for the individual years are necessary for specifying the
model. The fact that Zhang and Zou neglect them must be interpreted as a  mis-
specification of the model. Thus, for China, there exists a positive impact of decentrali-
zation of governmental activity on economic growth. This does however not generally
hold for transition countries. Naumets (2003) finds a negative, though not robust impact
of the share of own revenue from consolidated regional revenue on growth of real gross
value added in a panel of 24 Ukranian regions from 1998 to 2000.
Table 2: Empirical studies on the influence of fiscal decentralization or feder-
alism on economic growth in China and Ukraine
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Much the same holds for individual developed countries. Exploring American economic
development between 1790 and 1840, Wallis (1999) argues that fiscal federalism was
an important institutional precondition that fostered economic growth of the U.S.. In a
time-series analysis for the whole of the USA from 1951 to 1992, Xie, Zou and Davoodi
(1999) claim that the U.S. find themselves in a decentralization equilibrium because
differences in decentralization at the state level or at the local level do not have statisti-
cally significant effects on the real GDP growth. Akai and Sakata (2002), however, offer
evidence to the contrary for U.S. states. Taking into account additional explanatory vari-
ables and various indicators for the degree of fiscal federalism, they underline the posi-
tive influence on economic growth. If expenditure decentralization increases by 10 per-
cent, then the growth of GDP per capita increases by 1.6-3.2 percentage points. How-
ever, decentralization on the revenue side and indicators for fiscal autonomy of subna-
tional levels, measured by the share of own revenue in total revenue, do not have any
significant impact.
Table 3: Empirical studies on the influence of fiscal decentralization or feder-
alism on economic growth in the U.S. and Germany
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Meanwhile, two studies have also been conducted for Germany. Berthold, Drews and
Thode (2001) analyze the effects of horizontal fiscal equalization between states and of
supplementary federal grants on the regional economic development of the 16 Lander in
a panel analysis with annual data from 1991 to 1998. According to their estimates
higher grants in horizontal and vertical fiscal relations reduce the growth of nominal GDP
per capita of the Lander significantly. Behnisch, Büttner and Stegarescu (2002), how-
ever, report a positive effect of increasing federal activities – measured by the share of
expenditure at the federal level – on German growth of productivity in a time series
analysis from 1950 to 1990. Further empirical studies on the relation between fiscal
federalism and economic development are missing.
4. Discussion of the existing theoretical and econometric analyses
This survey on the theoretical and empirical literature of the impact of federalism and
decentralization on growth seems to imply at first sight that such a relationship is not
unambiguously supported empirically and that the theoretical considerations on the ex-
istence of such a relationship are insufficient. At a second inspection, the existing analy-
ses point at the necessity to analyze the issue more systematically by linking theoretic
and empirical analyses. The existing empirical studies either start from the political dis-
cussion, a discussion of the efficiency aspects of fiscal federalism, or from endogenous
growth models which however lack microfoundation. In this case it seems useful to dif-
ferentiate between the transmission mechanisms through which fiscal decentralization
works.
Following the considerations in section 2, federalism could influence regional agglom-
eration processes. This occurs, for instance, via a focus on regional infrastructure, via
investments in human capital aiming at regional needs, or by shaping the regulatory
framework at the sub-federal level in an appropriate fashion. It can be brought about by
a mixture of regulations, administrative processes, or appropriate tax prices for public
services. This mixture is essentially determined by the autonomy of lower levels of gov-19
ernment, with tax autonomy being of particular relevance. An important role for regional
economic development is to be seen in the capacity of the political system to react to
economic challenges via new proposals for economic policy solutions, aimed at r e-
gional needs. Federalism could, through its decentralized provision and financing of
services, favor political innovations and thus promote economic activity at the regional
level. This decentralized government spending policy would have to occur in the form of
a specialized design of infrastructure and human capital investments and in interaction
with the innovations of firms. The relation of private innovation to governmental policy is
not modeled in the existing studies, however. In future studies a step forward could be
made by theoretically modeling regional innovation processes and the influence of gov-
ernmental policy on them more precisely. At the outset of such a perspective would have
to be an endogenous growth model, based on New Economic Geography, which per-
mits to depict the interaction of political and entrepreneurial innovations. The modeling
of political innovations, which has been neglected in economics so far, is in this case of
considerable importance.
The degree of decentralization of revenues as well as of expenditure seems to be too
crudely measured in this context to appropriately describe the autonomy of lower level
governments. At the center of the theoretical considerations is the possibility to be able
to shape politics according to regional and local needs. The measures mentioned
above are problematic, because they do not necessarily encompass the actual deci-
sion-making competencies of lower level governments in public finance. Mexico and
Argentine, for instance, show a relatively decentralized government structure, if meas-
ured by the share of the sub-federal in total governmental expenditure. But the regional
level governments are mainly dependent on transfers of the federal government which,
moreover, are distributed according to political opportunism (Feld 2003). Some expen-
diture programs are only administered on a decentralized level, without permitting the
lower level governments many decision-making competencies. Treisman (2002),
therefore, discusses several additional variables, like the decentralization of public ad-
ministration and the autonomy of appointing or electing local representatives, beside of
fiscal decentralization for 154 countries.20
Almost all empirical studies have in common that the degree of fiscal federalism is
mainly measured by the share of lower level governments in total governmental expen-
diture or revenue, or they measure the degree of centralization of governmental activity
by the share of a central government in total governmental expenditure or revenue. Ebel
and Yilmaz (2002) start from this critique and find that, when decision-making compe-
tencies of lower level governments in tax policy are taken into consideration, there is a
positive influence of a federal governmental structure on economic development for 6
transition countries and 3 years. But their sample is much too small to obtain reliable
results. Akai and Sakata (2002) note that there is no influence of revenue autonomy on
economic growth of USA states. This result possibly is to be seen together with the low
variance that the chosen autonomy measures exhibit over time and across states. Lin
and Liu (2000), in turn, point at a positive impact of increased revenue autonomy and
budget responsibility of Chinese provinces with economic growth. Particularly, when
several countries are compared, a closer consideration of the actual autonomy of lower
level governments seems to be reasonable in the future.
Astonishing are the opposite empirical results for development and transition countries,
as reported in section 3. This can be traced back to the fact that the decentralization
process there leads to very heterogeneous results and, in many of these countries, to
anything but a step towards a market-preserving federalism in the sense of Weingast
(1995). In their critique Rodden and Rose-Ackerman (1997) point out that local interest
groups can, through decentralization of governmental activity, be given the opportunity to
pursue competition-limiting politics and thereby to skim off economic rents. Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2000) as well as Bardhan (2002) point out that, when looking at de-
centralization processes, a trade-off between the possible gains through competition
between jurisdictions and the possible losses due to an easier access of locally con-
centrated interest groups to the political decision-makers is faced. Brueckner (2000)
even attributes this rent-seeking of local interest groups to corruption. Decentralization in
developing countries, he argues, increases corruption, because additional decision-
makers have to be bribed in that case. Treisman (2001) points at the susceptibility also
of central governments to corruption. It means that decentralization of a corrupt regime
may result in corrupt officials now expecting bribes also locally, while the government at
the central level has to be further „served“. But decentralization can, through horizontal21
competition between regions and between local governments, reduce local rents
through competition, while corruption at the central level remains. Here as well, empirical
evidence is mixed. Fisman and Gatti (2002) provide evidence, for a cross-section of 55
countries, that decentralization leads to less corruption. Treisman (2002a), in turn,
shows contrary evidence for up to 166 countries.
The argument of Weingast (1995) that federalism serves as a credible pledge of a
strong central government not to confiscate (partially) specific investments, rests on the
assumption that these governments are actually able to assure property rights. But in
many developing and transition countries this is not the case. The reasons which were
given for a positive relation between federalism and economic growth in section 2 might
mainly be valid in democratic countries with sufficient experience with the rule of the law.
In developing and transition countries, the rule of the law and democratic traditions still
have to emerge so that the advantages of decentralization can develop. In these coun-
tries the situation is often worsened by ethnic conflicts and possible efforts to secede,
with situations close to civil war. More fiscal federalism with the concomitant autonomy
can be peace-enhancing, but also secession-enhancing (Treisman 1999, 2002b). Be-
cause of the rather insecure institutional and political situation in developing and transi-
tion countries it is therefore advisable to analyze the effect of federalism on economic
growth mainly in high-income countries.
In high-income countries in particular it cannot be sufficient to rely only on the expendi-
ture or revenue share of lower level governments in total governmental expenditure or
revenue. The federal OECD countries are very different in institutional terms. Switzer-
land, Canada and the U.S. rather rely on a model of competitive federalism, though
some elements of a cooperative federalism also play a role. Germany, Australia and
Austria rather tend to a cooperative federalism and exclude competition between lower
level governments to a different degree. In this case the difference between federal and
unitary or between more or less decentralized systems is less important than the actual
autonomy of lower level governments in fiscal policy, taken together with the degree of
tax and expenditure competition (respectively their export), with the degree of exploiting
economies of scale in the consumption of public goods, and with the design of various
instruments of fiscal equalization. Thus, it is the individual instrument of federalism, the22
economic effects of which have to be analyzed more closely. For instance one might ask
to what extent a constitutionally induced obligation of the federal government to bail-out
debt of its states in cases of budgetary emergency has the effect that necessary struc-
tural adjustments are postponed such that these states fall back in structural change. If
the analysis concentrates on high-income countries, a number of econometric difficulties
have to be taken into account. The number of OECD countries in question is too small to
obtain valid results in a cross-section analysis. The same is true for the sample of the
German Lander and the Swiss cantons, but also for US states, not to speak of Austrian
Lander, Canadian provinces or Australian states and territories. Thus only panel studies
provide valid estimates of the influence of federalism on economic growth in an en-
dogenous growth model, taking into account the typical control variables.
5. Concluding remarks
Whether federalism actually leads to more economic growth, because a regionally ori-
ented fiscal and economic policy helps to foster regionally concentrated agglomeration
processes or because competition between jurisdictions leads to more political innova-
tion, or because competitive federalism reduces distortions in political economy terms,
must remain open. The empirical evidence reported in this paper does not provide for
unambiguous results on the impact of a higher decentralization of governmental activity
on economic growth. This is in particular true with respect to developing countries,
where decentralization processes could in the end lead to higher levels of corruption.
The existing studies make it appear desirable to approach this set of questions system-
atically and to observe the following:
1.  Conclusions on the relation between federalism and growth can only be obtained on
the basis of endogenous growth models in which the regional process of economic
agglomeration is explicitly taken into consideration.
2.  Due to the specific problems in developing and transition countries it is necessary to
limit the empirical analyses to high income-countries.
3.  This requires the use of panel analyses for a sample of OECD countries or for the
regions of individual OECD countries, like Switzerland or Germany.23
4. The degree of decentralization should not be measured by the share of lower level
governments in total governmental expenditure or revenue. In turn, it seems neces-
sary to measure the differences in actual autonomy between jurisdictions. Beyond
this, it appears reasonable to look at the various instruments of cooperative feder-
alism and of competitive federalism, like fiscal equalization and grants, tax competi-
tion, or tax export.
The current discussion in Germany, but also in other federal and unitary countries re-
quires to more closely study the advantages and disadvantages of federalism or of fis-
cal decentralization. What finally matters, is the question which instruments of federalism
contribute to economic development of regions via which transition mechanisms and
how they ease structural adjustments. Not more, but also not less.
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